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Uncertainty, Strategic Sensemaking and Organisational Failure in the Art Market: 
:KDW:HQW:URQJZLWK/90+¶V,QYHVWPHQWLQ3KLOOLSV$XFWLRQHHUV" 
Abstract 
Strategic decision-making in volatile and uncertain environments, such as the art market, is not 
only instigated by rational interpretation of the external environment, but also by expert-based 
intuition. This paper investigates organisational failure at Phillips auctioneers between 1999 
and 2002, a period in which it was owned by the multinational luxury goods conglomerate 
Louis Vuitton Moët Hennessy (LVMH). We developed a framework for strategic sensemaking 
in art organisations that includes the processes of scanning, interpreting, strategising, acting 
and adjusting, which can take place in non-linear and recursive patterns in order to support 
continuous loops of improvement. Our analysis identifies the merits of intuitive decision-
making when realising a novel artistic and entrepreneurial vision, such as that which 
established Phillips as a boutique auction house. However, it also highlights the limitations of 
emotional and opportunistic decision-making which leads to blinded management if one or 
more of the processes of strategic sensemaking are ignored. 
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$OWKRXJK µWULDO-and-HUURU¶ LV D ZLGHO\ DFFHSWHG OHDUQLQJ PHFKDQLVP IRU RUJDQLVations, the 
literature of strategic management often dismisses the useful lessons which can be learned from 
the analysis of failure. This research focuses on organisational failure, which refers to the 
discontinuance of a business or ownership of it, or to temporary performance problems which 
do not necessarily require the end of the firm (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016; Mellahi & Wilkinson, 
2004). Existing research is clustered around the deterministic perspective which identifies 
sources of organisational failure in the external environment of firms, such as regulations, 
technological change, competition and unforeseen events (Amankwah-Amoah & Zhang, 2015; 
Hager et al., 1996); and the voluntaristic perspective which addresses failure as a result of 
agency, and in particular, as an outcome of poor leadership and decision-making, as well as 
maladministration, fraud and corruption (Amankwah-Amoah & Debrah, 2010). However, both 
perspectives are inadequate when treated separately. By placing too much emphasis on external 
factors, deterministic perspectives often dismiss the strategic choices of agents (Child, 1972); 
while voluntaristic perspectives cannot fully explain the strategic fit of firms that operate within 
uncertain environments that rely on creativity and innovation (Bilton, 2007; Caves, 2000). 
Due to these criticisms, an integrative approach has emerged which scrutinises organisational 
failure as the interaction of internal and external factors (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016). An 
integrative approach is particularly useful as a way of analysing failure within uncertain 
environments that affect the interpretations and actions of people in organisations (Miller & 
Shamsie, 1999). Under these circumstances, rationality is bounded (Simon, 1957), and strategic 
decision-making relies on sensemaking, which is defined as the ability of individuals to 
³XQGHUVWDQGLVVXHVRUHYHQWVWKDWDUHQRYHODPELJXRXVFRQIXVLQJRULQVRPHRWKHUZD\YLRODWH
H[SHFWDWLRQV´ Maitlis & Christianson, 2014:57). Although sensemaking aims to streamline 
decision-making by retrospectively pursuing corrective actions, strategic decisions within 
complex and uncertain environments are often complemented by the intuition of agents, 
derived from their perceptions, emotions, experience or opportunism (Salas et al., 2010; 
Sonenshein, 2007). However, the role of intuition in this process is contested, as it may lead to 
creative cognitions and innovative problem-solving (Calabretta et al., 2017); or to emotional 
decision-making and organisational blindness (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016). For this reason, we 
question the conditions under which the process of strategic sensemaking allows organisations 
to avoid failure within uncertain environments. 
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This research focuses on the volatile and uncertain environment of the art market. To answer 
our question, we develop the literature of strategic sensemaking to identify new paths of 
decision-making within art organisations, which do not necessarily innovate through a rational 
analysis of the external environment, but through the expertise-based intuition of decision-
makers in their attempt to promote a novel aesthetic vision while achieving commercial success 
(Lampel et al., 2000). We expand the framework of strategic sensemaking, based on the 
sequential processes of scanning, interpreting and acting (Thomas et al., 1993), by inserting 
the additional processes of strategising and adjusting as determinants of organisational success. 
The process of strategising is defined within the institutional context of the art market, and 
delineates the construction of strategy within art organisations based on the knowledge, 
professional judgement and insight of their leaders, their legitimacy within it, and their ability 
to introduce artistic innovations. The process of acting leads to the construction of an 
organisational configuration based on the cognitive, behavioural, normative and structural 
responses of people within organisations that support strategising (Meyer et al., 1993). Finally, 
we argue that strategic fit within uncertain and innovation-driven environments necessitates a 
sensemaking process of adjusting that facilitates continuous loops of improvement, according 
to which agents make sense of warning signals and perform corrective actions in the strategic 
and/or organisational configuration to avoid decline (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016). 
Our conceptual framework is developed within the context of the high-end auction industry, in 
which uncertain demand is caused by the volatility of the art market and the unpredictable 
behaviour of buyers (Caves, 2000). More specifically, our framework is illustrated by the case 
of the auction house Phillips in the period from 1999 to 2002, when it was owned by the 
multinational luxury goods conglomerate Louis Vuitton Moët Hennessy (LVMH). Phillips, 
bought by %HUQDUG $UQDXOW¶V /90+ DQG WKHQ UXQ E\ 6LPRQ GH 3XU\ DQG 'DQLHOOD
/X[HPERXUJKDGDOOWKHLQJUHGLHQWVWREUHDNWKHH[LVWLQJGXRSRO\RI6RWKHE\¶VDQG&KULVWLH¶V
and to become established as a high-end auction house (Adam, 2014). However, /90+¶V
strategy for Phillips failed due to a combination of emotional decision-making, high risk-taking 
propensity, and organisational blindness which obstructed strategic fit and led to the luxury 
conglomerate making an early exit from the auction house. In the next section, the literature of 
uncertainty, strategic sensemaking and failure in the art market is reviewed in order to construct 
our analytical framework. We then describe our methods and present the case of Phillips. 
Finally, based on our conceptual framework, we analyse the case of Phillips to extract lessons 
for strategic sensemaking and organisational failure literature. 
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2. Uncertainty, Strategic Sensemaking and Failure in the Art Market 
2.1. Uncertainty and strategic sensemaking in the art market 
The art market is a marketplace in which fine art is traded as a commodity and acquires a price 
(Graw, 2009). More specifically, the visual arts market is divided into the primary market, 
which facilitates the trading of newly created art; and the secondary market, which includes 
the resale of artworks through auction houses and private sales (Velthuis, 2005). Art dealers 
and auction houses are therefore the two main intermediaries in the art market and are 
responsible for the vast majority of the art trade: in 2016, $27.9 billion was traded through 
dealers and $16.9 billion through auction houses (Pownall, 2017). Art dealers, who sell either 
through their galleries or via art fairs, operate in both the primary and secondary art markets, 
while auction houses concentrate predominantly on the latter (Robertson, 2015). The case of 
the art market is unique because it facilitates trading art as a cultural good, which has a symbolic 
perceived value, and as a commodity with a market value, which represents the amount that a 
buyer is prepared to pay in order to acquire it (Graw, 2009). 
Uncertainty is a key characteristic of the art market. Demand in the primary market is uncertain 
because emerging artists often lack the legitimacy required to attract buyers (Delacour & Leca, 
2017); while in the secondary market, demand is uncertain, as it is not known whether a new 
buyer will be prepared to pay a higher price than the previous one. As a result, galleries and 
auction houses develop exhibitions and sales without being able to predict demand and critical 
acclaim with accuracy (Caves, 2000). Miller and Shamsie (1999) identify three types of 
XQFHUWDLQW\LQFXOWXUDORUJDQLVDWLRQV7KHILUVWLVµHQYLURQPHQWDOVWDWHXQFHUWDLQW\¶ZKLFKUHIHUV
to their inability to accurately forecast and control demand, due to the volatility of cultural 
commodities (Miller & Shamsie, 1999). Environmental state uncertainty may include factors 
endogenous to the art market, such as shifting trends, audiences and taste; changing 
geographies of cultural centres within and across cities; the critical acclaim and media reception 
of sales and exhibitions; the influence of stakeholders, such as the local community or policy-
makers, on an art organisation; the rise of new art-tech intermediaries such as online galleries 
and auction platforms which may threaten traditional business models (Dempster, 2006; 
Samdanis, 2016); and factors and events exogenous to the art market, such as the recent global 
economic recession or the rise of emerging economies and of high-net-worth individuals within 




of a lack of the understanding, skills, knowledge and/or resources required to encounter the 
unpredictability of the external environment (Miller & Shamsie, 1999). This type of uncertainty 
refers fundamentally to the ability of art organisations to use relevant resources in order to 
develop a sustained artistic strategy and organise themselves around it (Barney, 1991; Maitlis 
	/DZUHQFH7KHWKLUGW\SHRIXQFHUWDLQW\LVFDOOHGµGHFLVLRQUHVSRQVH¶DQGUHIHUVWR
the difficulty individuals encounter in predicting the outcome of specific decisions (Miller & 
Shamsie, 1999). These decisions can be related to selecting and pricing (or evaluating) artworks 
in gallery exhibitions or auction sales (Velthuis, 2005). Although price transparency in the art 
market has recently increased due to the existence of art price databases and indices (Coslor & 
Spaenjers, 2016), available information is incomplete because recorded prices only represent 
artworks sold publicly through the auction process and exclude private transactions in galleries 
and auction houses (Coslor, 2016). Therefore, the valuation of an artwork can rarely be based 
on complete information; instead, available information is complemented by qualitative 
assessments. Hence, decision-response uncertainty is, on the one hand, an outcome of cognitive 
limitations encountered by buyers and sellers in the art market who are constrained by their 
bounded rationality (Simon, 1957), as they are rarely able to use every factor, whether 
endogenous or exogenous to the art market, to support their decisions; and on the other hand, 
an outcome of equivocality, which includes the existence of several different, simultaneous 
interpretations about the meaning and value of artworks (Caves, 2000; Graw, 2009). As a 
result, many strategic decisions in art organisations are based on the artistic vision, expertise 
or intuition of their leaders and stakeholders (Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2012; Sonenshein, 2007). 
As a consequence, success or failure relies on the ability of individuals in art organisations to 
take strategic decisions under the conditions of uncertainty caused both by the information 
asymmetries that exist in their external environment, and by the cognitive boundaries they 
experience (Caves, 2000). In other words, success or failure in art organisations relies on the 
sensemaking of these individuals, which is broadly defLQHG DV ³WKH SURFHVV RI VRFLDO
construction that occurs when discrepant cues interrupt [their] ongoing activity, and involves 
UHWURVSHFWLYH GHYHORSPHQW RI SODXVLEOH PHDQLQJV WKDW UDWLRQDOLVH ZKDW SHRSOH DUH GRLQJ´
(Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010:551; Weick, 1995; Weick et al., 2005). However, sensemaking 
GLIIHUVIURPLQWXLWLRQZKLFKLV³XVHGWRGHVFULEHGHFLVLRQ-making behaviour that is speedy and 
for which the expert is unable to describe in detail the reasoning or other processes that 
SURGXFHGWKHDQVZHU´$Ninci & Sadler-Smith, 2012:107, emphasising Simon, 1957). 
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Current conceptualisations of strategic sensemaking are based on causal thinking, as strategy 
formulation relies on the sequential processes of scanning (gathering information), interpreting 
(developing ways to interpret information) and acting (taking decisions that lead to efficient 
organising), in response to relevant environmental triggers (Maitlis & Lawrence, 2003; Maitlis 
& Sonenshein, 2010; Thomas et al., 1993). Nevertheless, strategic decisions in art organisations 
are based not only on rationality, but also on the decision-PDNHUV¶ ³LQVLJKW DQG LQWXLWLYH
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI KRZ FUHDWLYH UHVRXUFHV FDQ EH GLVFRYHUHG DQG QRXULVKHG´ /DPSHO HW DO
2000: 265). The process of strategising in art organisations, defined as enacting and practising 
strategy, can be informed by the domain-specific knowledge and information, professional 
judgement, insight, and aesthetic vision of key decision-makers (Jarzabkowski, 2004; Salas et 
al., 2010; Weick et al., 2005). Consequently, strategising, informed by rational and intuitive 
decisions, leads to the construction of strategic configurations in art organisations, with the aim 
of legitimising their identity as connoisseurs, experts and innovators in the art market. 





strategic decisions based on their hybrid aesthetic and commercial logic (Eikhof & Haunschild, 
2007). However, the strategies of organisations within the creative industries should vary 
across different creative domains: for instance, organisations in the art market are more geared 
towards artistic novelty, trading tangible cultural objects, in contrast to performing arts 
organisations which are inclined towards artistic virtuosity, aiming to provide intangible 
cultural experiences (Dempster, 2006; Gilmore, 1988; Petterson, 2014). In the remainder of 
this section, the process of strategising within art organisations will be analysed, based on the 
components of knowledge, legitimacy and artistic innovation. 
Knowledge. Art dealers and auction houses that occupy powerful positions in the art market 
can mitigate uncertainty by exploiting information asymmetries which are related both to their 
object-based knowledge and to their access to art market and art world information. Object-
based knowledge refers to the connoisseurship of experts concerning the symbolic and 
economic value of an artwork, theiUDFFHVVWRWKDWDUWZRUN¶VSURYHQDQFHRZQHUVKLSKLVWRU\
and due diligence (authenticity reports), as well as their ability to authenticate a cultural object 
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through vetting (Hackforth-Jones, 2016). In contrast to the process of authenticating an 
artwork, which should be definitive and objective (i.e. an artwork is either authentic or not 
DXWKHQWLFWKHSURFHVVRISULFLQJDQDUWZRUNUHOLHVWRDODUJHGHJUHHRQWKHµJXWIHHOLQJ¶H[SHUW-
based intuition and professional judgement of sellers who combine their domain-specific, tacit 
knowledge with historical art market information (Salas et al., 2010; Velthuis, 2005). Within 
auction houses, these processes are followed in order to provide the high and low estimate for 
an artwork, but in private transactions within galleries or auction houses, the final prices of 
artworks often result from negotiations between buyers and sellers. Finally, art-world 
knowledge includes the access of art dealers and auction houses to undisclosed information 
and their understanding of ways of promoting an artwork within the art-world ecosystem which 
could increase its future symbolic and economic value, such as the interest of certain collectors 
LQ LW WKH LQFOXVLRQ RI DQ DUWLVW¶V ZRUN ZLWKLQ D WHPSRUDU\ H[KLELWLRQ RU WKH FROOHFWLRQ of a 
museum; or its selection for national and international biennials. 
Legitimacy,QWKHDEVHQFHRIVHWUXOHVZLWKZKLFKWRGHILQHµJRRG¶DUWWKHUROHRILQWHUPHGLDULHV
in the art market is crucial in terms of distinguishing and legitimising art (Bourdieu, 1984). The 
ability of these intermediaries to construct the symbolic value of an artwork depends on their 
power position in the artistic field, which in turn derives from their knowledge and legitimacy 
as experts (Bourdieu, 1993). Art galleries, art fairs and auction houses tackle uncertainty, 
essentially as a matter of building trust and managing their reputation within the art market. 
The success of these art organisations relies partly on the management of their symbolic 
resources, which form the baVLVIRUFOLHQWV¶WUXVWLQLW7KHVHV\PEROLFUHVRXUFHVLQFOXGHIRU
LQVWDQFH WKH UHSXWDWLRQ RI DQ DXFWLRQ KRXVH ZKLFK LV EXLOW XS WKURXJK ³UHSHDWHG GHDOLQJV´
(Caves, 2000:335). In contrast, the failure of an auction house to detect fakes or forgeries can 
harm its reputation and undermine the trust of its clients (Bellingham, 2016). While economic 
value is determined in the art market, the symbolic value of an artwork is constructed in the 
artistic field, which includes galleries, art fairs, biennials, foundations and museums (Becker, 
1982; Bourdieu, 1993). The symbolic value of an artwork forms the basis of its economic value, 
DVEX\HUV¶GHFLVLRQVDUHEDVHGRQSHUVRQDOWDVWHDQGRIWHQDOVRRQWKHYLHZVRIDUWFULWLFVRU
advisers. The high prices of artworks achieved by art galleries and auction houses can also have 
a symbolic effect on buyers and audiences, often attracting media attention (i.e. record sales), 
while legitimising these vendors (Velthuis, 2005). Hence, art dealers and auction houses reduce 
uncertainty by occupying a powerful position in the art market, engaging in networks of mutual 
recognition, such as their access to an elite clientele of collectors (Bourdieu, 1993). 
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Artistic innovation. The success of art organisations depends on their ability to set new trends, 
often by taking risks and experimenting with their cultural offering (Caves, 2000). On the basis 
of artistic innovation, art organisations compete both locally and internationally (Castañer & 
Campos, 2002). Art organisations instLJDWH µFRQWHQW DUWLVWLF LQQRYDWLRQ¶ E\ VHOHFWLQJ
UHSUHVHQWLQJRUGLVSOD\LQJQHZDUWLVWVDVZHOODVµIRUPDUWLVWLFLQQRYDWLRQ¶ZKHQWKH\GHYHORS
innovative ways in which their audiences can interact with art (Castañer & Campos, 2002), 
such as how an exhibition is curated, and how the aesthetic experience of the audience is 
influenced by the architecture and spaces of these art organisations (Putnam, 2009). For 
example, the transformation of the high-end auction into a glamorous evening event was 
inauguratHGLQE\WKHGLUHFWRURI6RWKHE\¶V3HWHU:LOVRQZKRRUFKHVWUDWHGDPHPRUDEOH
experience for the audience, in which the preview, the catalogue and the performance of the 
auctioneer all played major roles in generating demand and attracting media attention 
(Bellingham, 2016). Art organisations also engage with art-business innovation by enriching 
WKHLUEXVLQHVVDFWLYLWLHVRUE\H[SDQGLQJWKHPLQWRRWKHUSDUWVRIWKHDUWZRUOG6RWKHE\¶VIRU
instance, owns the S|2 Gallery in London and uses it to promote private sales within an 
experimental gallery context. 
2.3. Organisational configurations in the art market 
According to the configurational approach, action in organisations is emergent, idiosyncratic, 
situational and context-specific, and forms the basis of cognitive and behavioural patterns, 
processes, practices and structures that derive from strategic sensemaking (Meyer et al., 1993). 
,QFRQWUDVWWRWKHFRQWLQJHQF\DSSURDFKDFFRUGLQJWRZKLFKILUPVKDYHWRLGHQWLI\µRQHEHVW
ZD\¶ WR ILW LQWR DQ Hnvironment, the configurational approach stresses that sensemaking is 
influenced by the biases of individuals and the power relations within organisations, especially 
under conditions of uncertainty and equivocality (Simon, 1957). The section below analyses 
the ways in which the sensemaking process of acting leads to the construction of organisational 
configurations based on leadership, the resources of the firm and organisational structure. 
Leadership. The personality traits of the leaders of organisations reflect on their organisational 
configuration (Korunka et al., 2003). This is particularly true in the case of art organisations, 
as the vast majority are family or individual businesses and small enterprises (Velthuis, 2005; 
Resch, 2015). Leaders of these organisations embody authentic leadership (Ladkin & Taylor, 
2010). A typical narrative for many art dealers, including iconic dealers such as Paul Durand-
Ruel and Leo Castelli, is intended to demonstrate their authenticity as ideological leaders who 
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identify with the artists they represent, with the aim of solidifying their longevity both 
practically and historically (Wijnberg & Gemser, 2000; Winkleman, 2015). Interestingly, the 
CEO of the high-end auction house is usually a back-stage figure, while the front-stage leader 
is the auctioneer, who often acquires celebrity status: a good example of this is the former 
6RWKHE\¶VDXFWLRQHHU7RELDV0H\HUZKREHFDPHIDPRXVIRUKLVVKRZPDQVKLSGXULQJDXFWLRQV
(Graw, 2009). In addition, leadership style is also important because it determines the processes 
DQG QRUPV WKDW XQGHUSLQ WKH LQYROYHPHQW LQ VWUDWHJLVLQJ RI DQ RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V VWDII 7KH DUW
dealer Larry Gagosian is often portrayed as an autocratic leader who prioritises selling art, but 
in fact, the international reputation of his gallery relies on a decentralised structure in which 
his sales associates can operate autonomously and in close collaboration with artists and 
collectors (Resch, 2015). Finally, leadership in art organisations is associated with the 
propensity to take risks (Korunka et al., 2003). In art galleries, this risk-taking propensity is 
related to their development of experimental exhibitions, although this cannot be easily 
measured (Resch, 2015). However, in high-end auction houses, risks are quantified in terms of 
auction guarantees which are used to attract consignments (Adam, 2014; Health, 2012). 
)LUP¶V5HVRXUFHV5HVRXUFHVDUHGHILQHGDV³DOODVVHWVFDSDELOLWLHVRUJDQLVDWLRQDOSURFHVVHV
firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to 
FRQFHLYHRIDQGLPSOHPHQWVWUDWHJLHVWKDWLPSURYHLWVHIILFLHQF\DQGHIIHFWLYHQHVV´%DUQH\
1991:101). Art galleries and auction houses possess physical capital resources, such as 
economic capital, artworks and presence in prestigious locations and also online (Khaire, 
2015). In particular, technology in auction houses is used to enhance their authentication 
capabilities and to strengthen their art market intelligence (Samdanis, 2016). The most 
important resource is perhaps human capital, which includes the expertise, knowledge and 
relationships of individuals working in a firm. Art organisations invest significantly in the 
recruitment of key individuals from the art world, such as art consultants or museum directors, 
in their attempts to broaden their social network and elite clientele, and to establish their 
reputation as connoisseurs in certain segments of the art market (Winkleman, 2015). For 
instance, in 2014, Phillips reopened its watch department in collaboration with Aurel Bacs, 
³WKHFKDULVPDWLFSDVVLRQDWHVWDUDXFWLRQHHUZKRUDQWKHZDWFKGHSDUWPHQWDW&KULVWLH¶VIRUD
GHFDGH´/DQNDULQLQS7KHVXFFHVVRIILUPVLQWKHPDUNHWUHOLHVRQWKHLUDFFXPXODWHG
symbolic capital, which represents the status and reputation of their organisation, as well as 
their position in the artistic field as connoisseurs who can legitimately identify and consecrate 
artists, and then manage their reputation through a durable network of clients (Bourdieu, 1993). 
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Organisational structure. With the exception of high-end auction houses and some blue-chip 
galleries which demonstrate high degrees of centralisation, formalisation and specialisation, 
the majority of art organisations employee flat, flexible and informal structures. Art galleries 
and small auction houses often attempt to reduce uncertainty by operating as adhocracies, 
providing the flexibility required to develop novel shows and sales by utilising diverse skills 
and agents, as well as both internal and external knowledge and expertise (Bilton, 2007; Caves, 
2000; Resch, 2015). In contrast, high-end auction houses are organised as bureaucracies with 
as many as two thousand employees, international operations and specialised departments, such 
DVµ&RQWHPSRUDU\$UW¶RUµ,VODPLF	0LGGOH(DVWHUQ$UW¶LQRUGHUWRHQKDQFHWKHLUNQRZOHGJH
and reputation within these art markets. However, these auction houses also deploy formal and 
LQIRUPDOVWUXFWXUHVZLWKLQDQGEH\RQGWKHLUERXQGDULHV,QHDUO\IRUH[DPSOH6RWKHE\¶V
paid $85 million to acquire the art consultancy Art Agency Partners (AAP), owned by Amy 
Cappellazzo, who had until 2013 been the high-SURILOH FKDLU RI &KULVWLH¶V SRVW-war and 
contemporary art department, bringing to the business her expertise in modern and 
contemporary art, together with her rich network of clients (The Economist, 2016). 
2.4. Organisational failure in the art market 
Strategic sensemaking within an organisation should include the process of adjusting its 
strategic and organisational configuration, in order to impede or avert organisational decline, 
known also as the stages of decline (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016). Adjusting is a sensemaking 
process in which inadequacies in the performance of an organisation are discovered and 
exposed before corrective actions are introduced (Salas et al., 2010). According to Amankwah-
$PRDK³WKHSURFHVVRIGHFOLQHFDQEHVHHQDVWKHVKULQNLQJDQGGHWHULRUDWLRQRI
resources and capabilities of the firm, which then causes it to lose legitimacy and ability to self-
JRYHUQ´&RUUXSWRUIUDXGXOHQWOHDGHUVFDQFDXVHRUJDQLVDWLRQDOIDLOXUHVUHVXOWLQJLQDORVVRI
legitimacy for these firms. For instance, in the early 2000s, a price-fixing scandal orchestrated 
E\WKHSULQFLSDORZQHUDQGFKDLUPDQRI6RWKHE\¶V$OIUHG7DXEPDQDQGWKH&(2RI&KULVWLH¶V 
&KULVWRSKHU'DYLGJHKDUPHG WKH UHSXWDWLRQRIERWKRUJDQLVDWLRQVXQGHUPLQLQJFXVWRPHUV¶
trust in them (Vogel & Blumenthal, 2002). 
The process of adjustment requires recognition of and response to early warning signals, such 
as a decline in resources, sales and expertise (Weitzel & Johnson, 1989). The failure of art 
galleries and auction houses may result from their inability to find buyers, which could be seen 
in turn as an inability to generate demand and to value artworks accurately (Christopherson, 
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2014). Not only can individual art works fail to sell, but an entire sale can also be considered 
unsuccessful if total sales do not reach the total reserve price. Leaders in art organisations may 
encounter decision-response uncertainty when responding to weak performance by downsizing 
or restructuring, causing failure by maladaptation, either in the form of inappropriate responses 
or an inability to adapt to changing conditions (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016). The process of 
sensemaking is also apparent in the stages of dissolution and cessation, when decisions to close 
RSHUDWLRQVDQGWHUPLQDWHDILUP¶VH[LVWHQFHDUHWDNHQWRRHDUO\RUWRRODWH0RUHEURDGO\WKH
process of adjusting includes corrective actions in response to earlier predictions about 
performance (Salas et al., 2010). As a result, adjusting can help art organisations to avoid 
failure by clearly setting key performance indicators, building learning mechanisms within art 
organisations that aim to upgrade their knowledge, skills and expertise (Pandza & Thorpe, 
2009), and by developing processes to respond to crisis situations. 
Figure 1 presents a conceptual framework for strategic sensemaking in art organisations. 
Initially, it should be noted that strategic sensemaking mediates the strategic and organisational 
configurations which are entangled with each other. For instance, symbolic capital is not 
automatically translated into the construction of symbolic value for artworks, although this may 
happen though the creation of innovative exhibitions, or by using informal relationships to 
place an artwork in an important private collection. In addition, the instigator of strategic 
sensemaking can be: (1) the analysis of the external environment, as decision-makers use their 
causal thinking to interpret and translate information into organisational action (Thomas et al., 
1993); (2) the tacit knowledge, experience, professional judgement and vision of leaders in art 
organisations, who use their intuitive thinking to deploy strategic configurations that aim to 
establish their reputation in the art market as trusted and innovative vendors (Salas et al., 2010); 
and (3) the analysis of the organisational configuration of an art organisation, reflecting on 
TXHVWLRQVVXFKDVµZKRDUHZH"¶ZKDWGRZHNQRZ"¶µZKRPGRZHNQRZ"¶ZLWKLQDSURFHVV
of value creation that requires what is known as effectual thinking (Savasrathy, 2001). 
Although intuitive thinking is important if art organisations are to promote novelty and 
originality, causal and effectual thinking should complement strategic sensemaking to ensure 
the commercial and organisational feasibility of an artistic strategy. Hence, the five processes 
of strategic sensemaking can be performed in a non-linear way, but the presence of all five is 
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3. Research Method 
This paper investigates the role played by strategic sensemaking in organisational failure within 
the uncertain and volatile environment of the auction industry, using the instrumental case of 
the auctioneers Phillips (Caves, 2000; Stake, 1995). Strategic sensemaking is analysed through 
the historical case of Phillips, focusing on the organisation as the unit of analysis (Gibbert & 
Ruigrok, 2010; Silverman, 2000; Stake, 1995), and scrutinising social events which are 
µVLWXDWHGLQWLPHDQGVSDFH¶during the period between 1999 and 2002, when Phillips was under 
the ownership of LVMH (Skocpol, 1984). The paper investigates a single case study in order 
to examine the ways in which the processes of strategic sensemaking (scanning, interpreting, 
strategising, acting and adjusting) influenced the strategic and organisational configuration of 
Phillips. It then critically evaluates the impact of strategic sensemaking on the organisational 
failure of Phillips within LVMH. 
The case of Phillips was selected because of the failure of the firm despite its receipt of 
significant financial support from the luxury goods conglomerate LVMH. This case study is 
based on secondary data collected from academic publications (e.g. Haruvy et al., 2008; Heath, 
2012), magazine articles (e.g. The Economist, 2002; 2011; 2016), specialist books (e.g. Adam, 
2014; de Pury, 2016; Luxembourg, 2014), and annual reports (e.g., LVMH, 1999; 2000; 2001; 
2002), which provide rich information about the activities and strategy of the auction house 
and the luxury firm, and consider a wide variety of projects and strategies during the historical 
period investigated. A historical case study is an appropriate way of studying sensemaking and 
organisational failure, because it provides an opportunity to access internal and external sources 
of data, which are both synchronous and retrospective (Table 1). While the internal sources 
indicate sensemaking as manifested in discourses of action within an organisation, the external 
sources expose the ways in which a firm is perceived by its stakeholders, media and 
commentators (Bednar, 2012; Taylor & Robichaud, 2004). Our analysis of sensemaking at 
Phillips is also based on sources which are synchronous and retrospective in regard to the time 
of the events. While synchronous interpretations reveal the sensemaking processes which took 






Table 1: Research Template and Sources of Data  
 
Source: authors 
The method employed to analyse the data was within-case analysis, which took place through 
the process of narrative-writing, integrating the findings of the case study with the processes 
of strategic sensemaking, as outlined in our conceptual framework (Yin, 1994). Analysing 
strategic sensemaking and organisational failure requires a process of reflexivity on behalf of 
the researcher in terms of interpreting both historical events and the interpretations surrounding 
them (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). Reflective research can unlock approaches to strategic 
sensemaking beyond rational decision-making (Thomas et al., 1993), because it makes the 
researcher aware that there are countless empirical possibilities and socially constructed truths. 
This means that attention shifts from rigidly following a research protocol to justifying in a 
self-critical spirit why certain approaches have been taken in this research (Alvesson & 
Sköldberg, 2009). 
Level of Analysis Data Source Type of Text 










2. Internal Sources 
(Retrospective) 
Luxembourg (2014) 
De Pury (2016) 
Special Interest Book 
Autobiography 
3. External Sources 
(Synchronous) 
Adam (2002) 





Sorkin & Vogel (2002) 
The Economist (2001) 




















Ashenfelter & Graddy (2005) 
Bellingham (2016) 
Business Report (2004) 
Darby (2016) 
Donzé (2018) 
Haruvy et al. (2008) 
Heath (2012) 
The Economist (2011) 
Vogel & Blumenthal (2012) 
Art Market Report 
Special Interest Book 
Academic Journal Publication 
Academic Book Chapter 
Magazine Article  
Academic Book Chapter 
Academic Book Chapter 
Academic Journal Publication 





Based on our conceptual framework, we argue that strategic sensemaking and organisational 
failure are situational and idiosyncratic to a firm, industry and context. As a result, our study 
lacks external validity, as the findings of this study cannot be generalised beyond the context 
investigated (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). However, this lack of external validity is compensated 
IRUE\WKHVWXG\¶VLQWHUQDOYDOLGLW\SURYLGLQJDFRQFHSWXDOIUDPHZRUNWKDWFRXOGEHXVHGWR
analyse organisational failure as a dynamic phenomenon in the art market. More specifically, 
the analytical generalisation of our framework is based on abductive reasoning (Dubois & 
Gadde, 2002), which requires an inductive contextualisation of the strategic configuration of 
firms within a particular institutional context based on prior research (i.e. knowledge, 
legitimacy and artistic innovation in the art market) before the deductive application of the 
framework to a particular context (i.e. the case of Phillips). This conceptual framework could 
enable other researchers to replicate the findings of this study, as well as analysing cases of art 
organisations which face similar conditions of uncertainty, such as other auction houses, art 
galleries or art fairs. Finally, the reliability of this study is ensured by using multiple, diverse 
sources of information (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). 
4. The Case of Phillips (1999-2002) in the Auction Industry 
4.1. An overview of the auction industry 
)LQHDUWDXFWLRQKRXVHVDUHIDPRXVO\UHVLOLHQWRUJDQLVDWLRQV6RWKHE\¶VDQG&KULVWLH¶VWKHWZR
largest auction houses in the world, have existed since 1744 and 1766 respectively, accounting 
in 2016 for almost half of the $16.9 billion global auction market (Figure 2; Heath, 2012; 
3RZQDOO7KHULVHRI%ULWLVKDUWDXFWLRQHHUVVXFKDV&KULVWLH¶V6RWKHE\¶V3KLOOLSVDQG
Bonhams, is largely attributed to the excessive supply of fine art consigned to Britain by the 
displaced French aristocracy during the aftermath of the French Revolution in 1789 
(Bellingham, 2016). For centuries, the British aristocracy has built strong connections with the 
WZRPDLQDXFWLRQKRXVHV6RWKHE\¶VDQG&KULVWLH¶VIRUPLQJDOR\DOFOLHQWHOHZLWKDQDSSHWLWH
for cultural consumption. However, the role of auction houses changed at the beginning of the 
20th FHQWXU\WRPDLQO\VXSSO\LQJWKHµZKROHVDOH¶VHFRQGDU\PDUNHWDQGVHOOLQJWRDUWGHDOHUV 
Auction houses constitute an important intermediary within the art market, concentrating 
buyers and sellers in a single location. The auction industry is generally considered to be a 
three-tier market (Caves, 2000), and each of the three tiers encounters different conditions of 




houses face uncertainty when sourcing valuable artworks, as fierce competition reduces their 
bargaining power over consigners, leading them to take significant risks, including the 
provision of financial guarantees to secure consignments (Adam, 2014; Heath, 2012). The 
second tier resembles the first by trDGLQJ LQ ³KLJKO\-valuable and well-NQRZQ´FROOHFWLEOHV
worldwide, although in lower volume (Caves, 2000:334). Second-tier auction houses are 
mainly concerned with staging a limited number of high-quality, often niche-market auctions, 
such as in design (e.g. Phillips) or antiques (e.g. Bonhams); for them, shifting trends like the 
rise of contemporary art can become an important source of uncertainty. The third tier includes 
peripheral, often family-owned, auction houses, which offer a smaller range of more localised 
REMHFWVWKDWJHQHUDOO\³VOLGHLQWRWKHFDWHJRULHVRIGHFRUDWLYHDUWVDQGKRXVHKROGJRRGV´&DYHV
2000:334). Third-tier auction houses may face risks associated with an over-reliance on certain 
clients and, in some cases, the family members who maintain these connections; it is uncertain 
whether these local networks of clients will be maintained, especially with the rise of online 
auction houses (Heath, 2012; Khaire, 2015).  Nevertheless, the boundaries between the three 
tiers are not always clear, as high-end auction houses increasingly target the most profitable 
middle-segment market, which accounts for sales of between $5,000-$500,000. Finally, the 
rise of online auctioneers, such as Paddle8 (founded in 2011), may threaten the dominance of 
all tiers, being capable of both facilitating blue-chip art trading and tapping into the middle- 
















4.2. The case of Phillips auctioneers within the LVMH Group (1999-2002) 
7KH DFTXLVLWLRQ RI 3KLOOLSV E\ %HUQDUG $UQDXOW¶V /90+ *URXS ZDV PDMRU QHZV LQ WKH DUW
world. At the end of 1999, LVMH paid $96 million to acquire Phillips, one of the oldest British 
DXFWLRQKRXVHVZKLFKKDGEHHQIRXQGHGLQDQG³KDVEXLOWXSDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHSXWDWLRQ
with buyers and art press, acquired thanks to the high professionalism of its sales and valuation 
VHUYLFHV´/90+,QLWVILUVW\HDUZLWKLQWKH/90+*URXS3KLOOLSV³VWUHQJWKHQHG
LWV PDQDJHPHQW DQG EXLOW XS LWV WHDP RI H[SHUWV DQG UHFRJQL]HG DUW VSHFLDOLVWV´ /90+
 7KH PRVW VWULNLQJ PRYH ZDV LWV SDUWQHUVKLS LQ  ZLWK WZR IRUPHU 6RWKHE\¶V
executives, Simon de Pury and Daniella Luxembourg, who were operating as private dealers 
in Geneva specialising in Impressionism and modern art (Adam, 2014; Heath, 2012). Phillips 
had all the ingredients of a successful venture: a steady flow of capital sourced from the luxury 
giant LVMH, the transfer of knowledge from the luxury industry to the auction business and 
the experience of world-class dealers, such as de Pury and Luxembourg. The case of Phillips 
is controversial, as the financial press regard it as a major failure which resulted in significant 
losses ± of around $400 million ± for LVMH that forced the luxury conglomerate to sell 72.5% 
of its stake to de Pury and Luxembourg in December 2001 (The Economist, 2002). 
The late 1990s was a period of expansion for the auction market, which grew by more than 
50% in terms of annual auction sales turnover between 1998 and 2000 (Figure 3). After a failed 
DWWHPSW WR EX\ 6RWKHE\¶V LQ WKH ODWH V $UQDXOW ERXJKW 3KLOOLSV DV D UHVSRQVH WR WKH
acquisition of ChriVWLH¶VE\KLVULYDO)UDQoRLV3LQDXOWZKRVHKROGLQJFRPSDQ\$UWHPLVKDG
purchased a majority share of that auction house in 1998 (Scheep, 2001; The Economist, 2002). 
The acquisition of Phillips was seen by commentators as an attempt by Arnault to challenge 
WKHHVWDEOLVKHGDXFWLRQPDUNHWGXRSRO\RI&KULVWLH¶VDQG6RWKHE\¶V$GDP$WWKHWLPH
RIWKH6RWKHE\¶V&KULVWLH¶VSULFH-fixing scandal (Ashenfelter & Graddy, 2005), Phillips made 
its entry to the high-HQGDXFWLRQPDUNHWSURPRWLQJ LWVHOIDV µ3KLOOLSs: The other way to run 
DXFWLRQV¶ 8QGHUKLOO  +RZHYHU WKH SHUVRQDO ULYDOU\ RI $UQDXOW ZLWK 3LQDXOW SURYHG
SUREOHPDWLF IRU /90+¶V LQYROYHPHQW LQ WKH DXFWLRQ LQGXVWU\ $UQDXOW¶V HDJHUQHVV WR RXW-
FRPSHWH6RWKHE\¶VDQG&KULVWLH¶V LQDVKRUWSHULRGRI WLPH OHG3KLOOLSV¶V OHDGHUVKLS WR WDNH
disproportionate risks in terms of rapid expansion and auction guarantees, in order to attract 
















Source: ArtPrice (2005) 
$UQDXOW¶V LQYROYHPHQW LQ WKHDXFWLRQ LQGXVWU\ZDVSDUWRI /90+¶VGLYHUVLILFDWLRQ VWUDWHJ\
which involved investing in unrelated but prestigious businesses, and was intended to enhance 
its image as a global leader in the luxury industry (Donzé, 2018). LVMH stated in its annual 
UHSRUWIRUWKDW³RXUORQJWHUPYLVLRQDQGJRDODUHWRSHQHWUDWHWKHDUWZRUOGDZRUOGFORVH
to our customers and our culture, establish a foothold and grow in this fast expanding sector 







incompatibility of this sector with its core fashion business (de Pury, 2016). Art world 
FRPPHQWDWRUV DUJXHG WKDW ³DXFWLRQ KRXVHV DUH QRW OX[XU\ JRRGV´ VWUHVVLQJ WKDW LQYestors 
³QHYHUDFFHSWHG´/90+¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQWKHDXFWLRQLQGXVWU\³DVDVPDUWVWUDWHJ\´6RUNLQ
& Vogel, 2002: n.p.). Critical voices from the business world pointed out that 
FRPSOHPHQWDULWLHVEHWZHHQWKH/90+¶VFRUHEXVLQHVVDQGLWVLQYHVWPHQWLQ3KLOOLSs were not 




0RGHUQ DQG &RQWHPSRUDU\ $UW DXFWLRQV GXULQJ WKH 1HZ <RUN VSULQJ DQG DXWXPQ VDOHV´
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(LVMH, 2000:70). In particular, the decision to focus on Impressionism and modern art was 
reasonable, as these were the largest and more profitable segments in the art market, often 
DWWUDFWLQJ PHGLD DWWHQWLRQ WKURXJK WKH DFKLHYHPHQW RI UHFRUG ELGV VXFK DV 3DXO &p]DQQH¶V
painting, La côte du Galet, à Pontoise, which was sold at Phillips for $8,527,500 (Figure 4; 
LVMH, 2000). The Contemporary Art market also proved promising for Phillips, as Damien 
+LUVW¶VGLSW\FKIn and Out of Love was sold for an individual record price of $750,500 (LVMH, 
2000). As it stated in its annual report in 2000, LVMH deliberately targeted these art markets, 
FODLPLQJWKDW³WKHH[WHQVLYHPHGLDVSLQ-off resulting from these sales has helped strengthen 
3KLOOLSV¶LQWHUQDWLRQDOLPDJHFRQVLGHUDEO\´/90+ 
 









Source: Art Price (2017) 
%HLQJ DOLJQHG ZLWK $UQDXOW¶V YLVLRQ WR FRPSHWH LQ WKH KLJK-end auction market, Phillips 
pursued an international business strategy which prioritised its presence in the art hub of New 
<RUN$FFRUGLQJWR/90+¶VDQQXDOUHSRUW³3KLOOLSVRZQVWKHSUHPLVHVXVHGIRULWV
auction sales activities and the offices located on Bond Street and at Bayswater in London. 
Outside London, the sales rooms and UK-based offices are, either owned by the company (four 
of them), or rented (twenty-one). In addition, premises are rented in the different countries 
where the company is established. To boost its sales in New York, Phillips has rented a building 
RQWK6WUHHWDQGLVFXUUHQWO\UHQRYDWLQJLW´7KLVVWUDWHJLFFKDQJHIRU3KLOOLps required it to 




EXVLQHVV´/90++RZHYHU³WKHFRVWRIWhese operations, as well as the recruitment 
RIPRUHSHUVRQQHOZHLJKHGRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VUHVXOWVDQGOHGWRVLJQLILFDQWORVVHV´/90+
 ZKLOH DOVR SURGXFLQJ ³H[FHSWLRQDO FRVWV OLQNHG WR H[SDQGLQJ WKH EXVLQHVV DQG
boosting the image of Phillips, i.e(85PLOOLRQ´/90+ 
3KLOOLSV¶VILUVWVDOHLQ0D\ZDVQRWDVVXFFHVVIXODVLWKDGDQWLFLSDWHG$FFRUGLQJWRDQDUW
ZRUOGUHSRUWHU³3KLOOLSVVROGRQO\SHUFHQWRIWKHZRUNVRQRIIHUDWLWVILUVW1HZ<RUNDXFWLRQ
of impressionist and modern art ± despite the presence of Sharon Stone. To win customers from 
6RWKHE\¶VDQG&KULVWLH¶V3KLOOLSVLVEHOLHYHGWRKDYHJXDUDQWHHGXQUHDOLVWLFDOO\KLJKVDOHSULFHV
± DPRYHDQDO\VWVEHOLHYHUHVXOWHGLQKHIW\ORVVHVRQPLOOLRQLQVDOHV´8QGHUKill, 2001, 
n.p.). ,Q-DQXDU\3KLOOLSVPHUJHG³ZLWKSULYDWHDUWVDOHVFRPSDQ\GH3XU\	/X[HPERXUJ
$UW´DQG³WKHSDUWQHUVRIWKLVFRPSDQ\'DQLHOOD/X[HPERXUJDQG6LPRQGH3XU\UHFHLYHG
25% of the capital of the new entity known as Phillips, de Pury 	 /X[HPERXUJ´ /90+
Group, 2000:17). Luxembourg (2014:123) explained this process of business development: 
³:HIRFXVHGRXUPDLQHIIRUWVRQEXLOGLQJDQHZGHVLJQDWHGDXFWLRQYHQXHLQ1HZ<RUNDQG
moved to a beautiful building at 3 West 57th Street, which had been renovated with the help 
RI/90+¶VWDVWHPDNHU.DWHO/H%RXKULV,Q/RQGRQZHPRYHGIURPWKHROG3KLOOLSVEXLOGLQJ
at No.101 New Bond Street to Grosvenor Street, and in Geneva our old De Pury & Luxembourg 
offices on the Quai des Bergues were turned into auction offices. We also kept an office and 
salesroom in Zurich alongside maintaining our activities in the newly-appointed contemporary 
JDOOHU\RI'H3XU\	/X[HPERXUJDW.UHX]VWUDVVH´&KULVWRSKHU7KRPVRQ WKH&(2RI




These actions repositioned Phillips, de Pury & Luxembourg as a boutique auction house that 
gave particular emphasis to design, with elegantly curated previews, exquisitely designed 
catalogues and the important consignments grouped together in thoughtfully designed sales. 
7KHDXFWLRQKRXVHSLRQHHUHGWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIGHVLJQDVDQDXFWLRQFDWHJRU\³LQWKH
term Design Art was coined by Alexander Payne, director of design at Phillips de Pury & Co., 
who observed that some designers experimented with materials and form to the extent that the 
boundaries between art and design were blurred. Payne sensed that these works opened up new 
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possibilities in terms of the market and, accordingly, Phillips de Pury retitled its New York 
sales of twentieth-cenWXU\ GHVLJQ µ'HVLJQ $UW¶´ 'DUE\  0RUH EURDGO\ 3KLOOLSV
XQGHUZHQWDSURFHVVRIRUJDQLVDWLRQDOWUDQVIRUPDWLRQZKLFKUHTXLUHGWKDWWKH³EXVLQHVVKDGWR
be built from scratch, including client lists, teams of researchers and experts, and the entire 
DGPLQLVWUDWLYH RSHUDWLRQ´ /X[HPERXUJ  $OWKRXJK 3KLOOLSV DFKLHYHG LWV DLP RI
becoming an innovative boutique auction house, holding major auctions in New York in May 
DQG1RYHPEHU³WKHGHYHORSPHQWFRVWVRILWVLQWHUQDWLRQDODFWLYLW\ZHLJKHd on Phillips 
income from operations, which was sharply negative1´/90+ 
Financial guarantees were the main strategic method by which Phillips, de Pury & Luxembourg 
attempted to attract consigners within an auction market in which sellers have high bargaining 
power, as the cost of switching between auction houses is significantly low. This strategy did 
DWWUDFW PDMRU FRQVLJQPHQWV VXFK DV WKH ³KLJK-calibre collection that belonged to Heinz 
%HUJJUXHQDQDUWGHDOHULQ%HUOLQ´7KH(FRQRPLVW%\SURYLGLQJDJHQHURXVILQDQFLDO
guarantee, Phillips managed to out-FRPSHWH6RWKHE\¶VDQG&KULVWLH¶VEXWLQWKHHQGLWIDLOHG
to cover the guarantee (Heath, 2012; The Economist, 2002). Until 2001, Phillips, de Pury & 
Luxembourg had sold over $500 million worth of art (Luxembourg, 2014). According to Adam 
 QS ³3KLOOLSV GH 3XU\ 	 /X[HPERXUJ KDV EHHQ RYHUSD\LQJ ERWK WR EX\ ZKROH
collections for sale at auction ± such as the Berggruen and Smooke collections ± and to woo 
VHQLRU VSHFLDOLVWV IURP6RWKHE\¶VDQG&KULVWLH¶V´/X[HPERXUJ DGPLWV WKDW ³WKH
guarantees we gave for the great collections were not always covered, but it was the only option 
we had when entering into that high-end market. It was also not a strategy we wanted to apply 
as a long-term vision. These sales brought to us many more collectors than we could have 
GUHDPHGRIDQGZHZHUHDEOHWRFRPSHWHDORQJVLGH6RWKHE\¶VDQG&KULVWLH¶V on estates and 
FROOHFWLRQVVXFKDV$UWXUR6FKZDU]¶VFROOHFWLRQRI0DUFHO'XFKDPS¶VUHDG\PDGHV´ 
In November 2001, Phillips, de Pury & Luxembourg sold the Smooke collection of twentieth 
FHQWXU\DUW$FFRUGLQJWR9RJHO³WRZUHVWWKH6PRRNHFROOHFWLRQDZD\IURP6RWKHE\¶V
DQG&KULVWLH¶VWKHDJJUHVVLYHWKLUG-place auction house had offered the Smooke heirs a large 
guarantee ± an undisclosed sum given to the sellers regardless of a sale's outcome ± believed 
to have been around $185 million. Just before the sale, the Smooke heirs decided to keep works 
worth an estimated $15 million, which came off the guarantee2. But that meant Phillips still 




 $FFRUGLQJWR9RJHOQS³'XULQJWKHILQDOQHJRWLDWLRQVDERXWPLOOLRQZRUWKRIWKHDUW± small but 
rare works by Matisse, Picasso, Ernst and Derain ± were removed from the auction. When the auction catalogue 
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lost more than $80 million ± a price it was willing to pay to carve a niche in the market and 
take $86 million froP6RWKHE\¶VDQG&KULVWLH¶VERWWRPOLQHV´$OWKRXJKPRUHWKDQRIWKH
lots were sold, this sale proved detrimental to the involvement of LVMH in Phillips. 
Phillips failed to build a strong reputation in the high-end auction market, finding it very 
difficult to attract the same quality of consignments without an excessive use of guarantees. 
Simon de Pury claimed that the use of financial guarantees was the right way for Phillips to 
build market share (Economist, 2001). This type of organisational failure was not related to the 
DFFXUDF\RIWKHILUP¶VFDOFXODWLRQRIULVNVEXWWRWKHGHOLEHUDWHGHFLVLRQRI3KLOOLSV¶VOHDGHUVKLS
to pursue a risky strategy in exchange for long-term returns (Luxembourg, 2014). The use of 




³GLVWRUWSULFHV´LQ7KH(FRQRPLVW:KLOH3KLOOLSVZDVVWUXJJOLQJWRHVWDEOish itself in 
the high-HQGPDUNHWE\XVLQJILQDQFLDOJXDUDQWHHV'ROPDQZDVTXHVWLRQLQJZKHWKHU³WKHUHLV
HQRXJKEXVLQHVVDWWKHWRSIRUWKHWKUHH´JLYHQWKDWRQO\DERXWILIW\SULYDWHFROOHFWRUVLQWKH
world buy art works costing $20 million or more (EconRPLVW)RUWKLVUHDVRQ&KULVWLH¶V
DQG 6RWKHE\¶V UHDOLVHG WKDW RSHUDWLQJ LQ WKH PLGGOH VHJPHQW RI WKH DXFWLRQ PDUNHW FRXOG
SURYLGHDµVDIHW\QHW¶HVSHFLDOO\LQWLPHVRIHFRQRPLFGHFOLQH$VLQ&KULVWLH¶V6RXWK
Kensington saleroom, which specialised in the middle market, was an important revenue source 
for the company (Economist, 2001). 
Interestingly, LVMH also invested in middle-segment auction houses, such as the British 
middle-market auction house Bonhams & Brooks (LVMH, 2000), and Etude TajDQDµOHDGLQJ
)UHQFK ILQH DUWV DXFWLRQ KRXVH¶ /90+  0RUH VSHFLILFDOO\ ³LQ 1RYHPEHU 
3KLOOLSVGH3XU\DQG/X[HPERXUJ¶V8.DFWLYLWLHVDQG WKHDFWLYLWLHVRI%RQKDPV	%URRNV
merged within a joint entity, 49.9% of which was held by Phillips, de Pury and Luxembourg, 
WKXV PDLQWDLQLQJ LWV FRQWURO RI WKH ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO DFWLYLWLHV´ /90+   7KH
H[SDQVLRQ LQWR WKH DUWV DOVR LQFOXGHG WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI ³VSHFLDOL]HG PDJD]LQHV VXFK DV
Connaissance des Arts and Art & Auction´ /90+ ). According to Luxembourg 
                                                          
came out, rumours began circulating that most of this art had been bought by Bernard Arnault, the chairman of 






³WKHDLPZDVWRWXUQ3KLOOLSVLQWRDKLJK-end auction house and keep Bonhams as 
LW ZDV´ +RZHYHU DIWHU GH 3XU\ DQG /X[HPERXUJ MRLQHG WKH FRPSDQ\ ³WKH %ULWLVK HQG RI
Phillips was sold to Bonhams because the new regimHZDVXQLQWHUHVWHGLQWKHPLGGOHPDUNHW´
%HQQHWWQS,QFRQWUDVWWR6RWKHE\¶VDQG&KULVWLH¶VZKLFKPDLQWDLQHGDQGGHYHORSHG
operations in the middle market, Phillips neither created nor explored synergies between 
Phillips, Bonhams and Etude Tajan, or at least not in an obvious way. 
After the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre on 9/11, the stocks of many companies in 
the luxury industry ± among them LVMH ± plummeted in value (Figure 5; Luxembourg, 2014). 
What enabled Pinault to survive thLV FULVLV DQG PDLQWDLQ KLV FRQWURO RI &KULVWLH¶V ZDV WKH
governance structure of the company, as its funding was sourced through his private holding 
company Artemis and not through the publicly traded PPR [nowadays Kering] (de Pury, 
2016:187). In contrast, ³%HUQDUG $UQDXOW RZQHG 3KLOOLSV WKURXJK WKH YHU\ SXEOLFO\ WUDGHG
/90+ $OWKRXJK WKH ILQDQFLDO SUHVV ZDVQ¶W IRFXVLQJ RQ ZKDW 3LQDXOW ZDV GRLQJ ZLWK
&KULVWLH¶VWKHUHZDVDIDLUDPRXQWRISULQWTXHVWLRQLQJZKHWKHULWPDGHVHQVHIRU/90+WR
invest so heavily LQDQDUHDWKDWZDVFOHDUO\QRWSDUWRILWVFRUHEXVLQHVV´GH3XU\
)LQDOO\ WKHIDFW WKDW³/90+KDGSXOOHGRXWZDVDVWLJPDDVFDUOHW OHWWHUWKDWQRFRPSDQ\
FRXOGH[SHFWWRUHFRYHUIURPWKHXOWLPDWHYRWHRIQRFRQILGHQFH´GH3XU\). 
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a capital O. Daniella and I were informed that LVMH wanted to immediately start negotiating 
WKHLUH[LW´/90+¶VDJJUHVVLYHWDFWLFVWRDFTXLUHPDUNHWVKDUHIURP6RWKHE\¶VDQG&KULVWLH¶V
proved risky and expensive, and significant losses led the Group to issue a profit warning in 
1RYHPEHUDV³3KLOOLSVZDVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUDQHVWLPDWHGPORVVDW/90+´WKDW\HDU
7KH(FRQRPLVW$UQDXOW¶VVZLIWUHVSRQVHZDVDOVRLQIOXHQFHGE\WKHGURSLQWKHOX[XU\-
JRRGVPDUNHWGXH WR³WKHHFRQRPLFUHFHVVLRQERWK LQ WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQG-DSDQ´DQG WKH
downward trend of the Paris CAC 40 inde[´DIWHU$XJXVW/90+7KHVHYHUH
shock caused by the 9/11 attacks affected the share price of LVMH which reached a historical 
low (Figure 5), forcing the Group to issue another profit warning ± the fourth in six months 
(Adam, 2002; LVMH, 2001). Under these circumstances, AUQDXOWFRXOGQRW³DIIRUGWRFRQWLQXH
EHLQJVRLQGXOJHQW´$GDPQS 
Despite the huge risks taken by Phillips and LVMH, the auction house never really joined the 
high-end auction house league. In 2001 Phillips achieved only $285.6 million of sales, in 
FRPSDULVRQWRWKHELOOLRQRI6RWKHE\¶VDQGELOOLRQRI&KULVWLH¶V$UW3ULFH
In December 2001, LVMH reduced its equity interest to 27.5%, transferring its controlling 
stake in Phillips to de Pury and LX[HPERXUJ/90+7KLVGHFLVLRQZDV³SDUWRI/90+
JURXS¶V VWUDWHJ\ WR IRFXV RQ H[SDQGLQJ LWV OX[XU\ EUDQGV´ /90+  /X[HPERXUJ
(2014:127) claims that after 2002 much of the auction industry adopted some of the 
conventions introduced by Phillips, such as the use of financial guarantees. 1RWDEO\³LQ the 
VSULQJDUWDXFWLRQVLQ6RWKHE\¶VDQG&KULVWLH¶VJUDQWHGVRPHRIWKHODUJHVWJXDUDQWHHV
ever, and this strategy proved successful in a booming art market. In the early 2000s, however, 
the art auction house Phillips was driven out of business and forced to reorganise, when it 
JUDQWHG H[FHVVLYH JXDUDQWHHV WR DWWUDFW EXVLQHVV DQG PDQ\ RI WKH SDLQWLQJV IDLOHG WR VHOO´
(Haruvy et al., 2008:442). 
$FFRUGLQJWR/X[HPERXUJ3KLOOLSVLQWURGXFHG³EHDXWLIXOO\GHVLJQHGFDWDORJXHV
the interior design and the rest of the packaging of auctions as a norm. The dream of building 
a boutique auction house can still be achieved. Endurance and long-term commitment are 
HVVHQWLDOWRWKHJDPHLQDGGLWLRQWRNQRZOHGJHRIWKHPDUNHW¶VH[SHUWVDQGOHDGHUV%XWDERYH
DOOWKHPDJLFGHSHQGVRQWKHIHZNH\FROOHFWRUVDQGWKHLUWUXO\JUHDWZRUNVRIDUW´+RZHYHU
more critical voices still raised concerns about $UQDXOW¶VDJJUHVVLYHWDFWLFV³LWHPHUJHGWKDW
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3KLOOLSV¶VFDVKUDWKHUWKDQLWVH[SHUWLVHKDGOXUHGVHOOHUVRIKLJK-quality art; they returned to 
&KULVWLH¶V DQG 6RWKHE\¶V 6R IDU 3KLOOLSV KDV ZRQ QR WRS FRQVLJQPHQW IRU WKH XSFRPLQJ
auctions this spring, GHVSLWHWKHFXUUHQWVWUHQJWKRIWKHDUWPDUNHW´7KH(FRQRPLVW 
 
Table 2: Key Events in the Case Study (December 1999 ± January 2003) 
Dec 1999 LVMH buys Phillips for $96 million 
Nov 2000 Impressionism and Modern Art Sale (NY) sells $32.6m (Low Est: $39.5m ± High Est: $54.1m) 
Jan 2001 De Pury & Luxembourg join Phillips, which is restructured into a boutique auction house 
Mar 2001 Collection Berggruen (Paris) is sold for $71.2m; guarantees of over $80m 
May 2001 Impressionism and Modern Art (NY) sells $124m (Low Est: $170m ± High Est: $236m) 
Jul 2001 LVMH acquires the middle-segment auction house Bonhams 
Aug 2001 Phillips signs $185m guarantees for Smooke Collection 
Sep 2001 LVMH stock plummets as a result of 9/11 terrorist attacks 
Nov 2001 Phillips pays $80m in guarantees to Smooke family 
Nov 2001 Contemporary Art sale fetches (NY) $10.63m at Phillips, eclipsing high estimate 
Dec 2001 LVMH sells 72.5% of Phillips share to de Pury & Luxembourg 
Jan 2003 Phillips sells the remaining 27.5% to de Pury 
 
Source: authors 
Table 2 summarises the key findings and highlights of the case of Phillips within LVMH. In 
2003 (n.p.), an Antiques Trade Gazette reporter described the situation at Phillips after the exit 
RI/90+LQWKHVHWHUPV³VSHDNLQJDERXWKLVKRSHVIRUWKHIXWXUHRIWKHFRPSDQ\0UGH3XU\
said that the management buy-RXWKHUDOGHGµDQH[SHUW-driven strategy for gURZWK´%XWDWWKH
VDPH WLPH KH FXW WKH 3KLOOLSV ZRUNIRUFH E\ D WKLUG PDNLQJ  RI  VWDII UHGXQGDQW¶
Following another disastrous Impressionist and modern art sale, de Pury decided to omit these 
art market categories from the Phillips portfolio (Antiques Trade Gazette, 2003). In the 
following years, Phillips pursued a far more modest strategy, generally avoiding the use of 
JXDUDQWHHVDV/X[HPERXUJH[SODLQHG³7KHPRVWLPSRUWDQWWKLQJWRGRQRZ>LQ@LVWR




5. An Analysis of Strategic Sensemaking and Failure at Phillips 
Table 3 summarises the strategic sensemaking of Phillips within LVMH from 1999 to 2002. 
Our conceptual framework addresses scanning, interpreting, strategising, acting and adjusting 
as the five processes of strategic sensemaking, and uses them to analyse organisational failure 
at Phillips. Four key strategic decisions are identified in the case study and are analysed below 
using our conceptual framewRUN$UQDXOW¶VGHFLVLRQWRHQWHUWKHKLJK-end auction market; 
 /90+¶V VHULHV RI LQYHVWPHQWV LQ WKH DUW ZRUOG  WKH GHFLVLRQ WR WDUJHW PDLQO\ WKH
Impressionism and modern art categories of the art market; and (4) the extensive use of 
financial guarantees to acquire valuable collections and attract positive publicity. It should be 
noted that the five sensemaking processes at Phillips were not performed in a sequential way. 
The trigger for strategic and organisational action at Phillips was not the careful scanning and 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRILQIRUPDWLRQIURPWKHH[WHUQDOHQYLURQPHQWEXW$UQDXOW¶VLQWXLWLYHGHFLVLRQWR
enter the high-end auction market. 
$UQDXOW¶VGHFLVLRQWRHQWHUWKHKLJK-end auction market$UQDXOW¶VGHFLVLRQWRHQWHUWKHDXFWLRQ
market had a mainly emotional trigger: to out-compete his arch-rival Pinault and the duopoly 
RI6RWKHE\¶VDQG&KULVWLH¶VWKDWKDGSUHYLRXVO\GRPLQDWHGWKHDXFWLRQPDUNHWDQGDWWKHWLPH
was experiencing turmoil, due to the exposure of a price-fixing scandal. Sensemaking is crucial 
as a way of explaining the role of perceptions, emotions, experience and behaviour of key 
individuals in affecting strategic and organisational configurations within art organisations. 
Although persistence and passion are virtues that inspire entrepreneurs to set challenging goals 
(Cardon et al., 2009), attitudes and behaviours, such as exaggerated pride, self-confidence, 
opportunism and arrogance, can also be perceived as audacious and hubristic, creating blind 
spots, biases and strong norms which can lead to organisational failure (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 
2004). $UQDXOW¶VLQVLVWHQFHRQFRPSHWLQJGLUHFWO\ZLWK6RWKHE\¶VDQG&KULVWLH¶VOHG3KLOOLSVWR
set unrealistic goals ± in terms of revenue ± and pursue a risky strategy: Phillips as a high-end 
auction house had to attract high quality consignments and the only way to achieve this was by 
transforming the auction house in a short period of time and by offering excessive financial 
guarantees. Although there is nothing unusual in a firm taking high risks and anticipating high 
returns, the short period of time and the large scale of organisational change at Phillips did not 





 Table 3: Strategic Sensemaking of Phillips by LVMH (1999-2002) 
 
 Source: authors  
 
 $UQDXOW¶VGHFLVLRQWRHQWHUWKHKLJK-
end auction market 
/90+¶VVHULHVRILQYHVWPHQWVLQ
the art world 
Targeting mainly the Impressionist & 
modern art market segment 
Extensive use of guarantees & 
negative publicity 
Scanning Arnault entered the high-end auction 
market due to his rivalry with Pinault. 
The Economist (2002); Underhill (2001) 
The art world was a meaningful 
market for LVMH to diversify into. 
Donzé (2018); LVMH (2000)  
Impressionism & modern art market as the 
largest and profitable market segment. 
ArtPrice (2017);  LVMH (2000) 
Important collections and record sales 
attracted positive publicity. 
LVMH (2000; 2001) 
Interpreting Arnault considered it possible to out-
FRPSHWH6RWKHE\¶VDQG&KULVWLH¶V 
Adam (2014);  Underhill (2001) 
The mid-market in the auction market 
had less priority for LVMH. 
Bennett (2003); Luxembourg (2014) 
Targeted chiefly the Impressionism & 
modern art market. 
LVMH (2000); Heath (2012) 
Offering guarantees was the only way 
to access the high-end market. 
Haruvy (2008); Luxembourg (2014) 
Strategising LVMH treated the action industry as 
similar to the luxury industry. 
Bennett (2003); LVMH (2000) 
Created an innovative boutique 
auction house in New York. 
Cuozzo (2002); Luxembourg (2014) 
Partnered with the established art dealers 
S. de Pury & D. Luxembourg. 
Adam (2014); Heath (2012) 
Reputation and trust were based on 
attracting high-profile collections. 
Luxembourg (2014); LVMH (2000) 
Acting $UQDXOW¶VVWUDWHJ\WR target the high-end 
auction market was uncontested. 
Bennett (2003); Luxembourg (2014) 
Deployed flexible structure, but 
concentrated activities in New York. 
LVMH (2000);  Luxembourg (2014) 
Invested in key personnel and business 
development to improve Phillips. 
LVMH (2000; 2001) 
Financial guarantees were used 
extensively to acquire collections. 
The Economist (2001); Vogel (2001) 
Adjusting $UQDXOWUHVSRQGHGµHSLVRGLFDOO\¶DIWHU
9/11 attacks and left Phillips. 
de Pury (2016) 
Restructuring led by de Pury took 
place after LVMH decided to exit. 
Antiques Trade Gazette (2003) 
De Pury decided to omit Impressionism & 
modern art categories after 2004. 
Business Report (2004) 
Issued four share profit warnings 
which led to LVMH exit. 
Adam (2002); LVMH (2001) 
Blind Spot The gap between Phillips and the two 
high-end auction houses was too wide. 
LVMH did not explore synergies 
between the auction houses it owned. 
Phillips could not foresee the growth of 
contemporary art market after 2006. 
Poor sales and high guarantees 
attracted negative publicity. 
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/90+¶VVHULHVRILQYHVWPHQWVLQWKHDUWZRUOG. In 1999, LVMH presented its investment in the 
art world as being compatible with its core business; however, two years later, the Group 
UHYHUVHGLWVSRVLWLRQGHFLGLQJWRIRFXVDJDLQRQWKHOX[XU\LQGXVWU\/90+¶VGHFLVLRQZDV
JUHHWHGZLWK VFHSWLFLVPIURP WKHEHJLQQLQJ ³$UQDXOWEHOLHYHG WKDW VHOOLQJDUWZRXOGEHQR
GLIIHUHQW´ WKDQ VHOOLQJ OX[XU\ SURGXFWV %HQQHWW  QS ,W LV GHEDWable whether the 
difference between the two industries was the reason for the failure of Phillips. The luxury 
industry can be considered to be similar to the high-end auction industry, as both trade in 
objects which are unique in terms of beauty and quality and exclusive in terms of price; both 
rely on sophisticated marketing campaigns and spatial aesthetics which fuel the myths 
surrounding the luxury shopping and auction experience (Adam, 2014; Kapferer, 2014). On 
the one hand, LVMH successfully explored the synergies between the two industries by 
transferring knowledge and expertise from the luxury sector in order to reposition Phillips as 
an innovative boutique auction house. On the other hand, LVMH was less successful in 
creating synergies between its investments in the art market, targeting the high-end auction 
market with Phillips and the middle market with Bonhams and Etude Tajan. While a marketing 
strategy of distinguishing between brands in order to appeal to different market segments 
makes sense in the luxury industry, this approach shows relatively low sensemaking of the 
auction industry, in terms of interpreting the importance of the middle segment of the market, 
DVLWSURYLGHGDYLWDOµVDIHW\QHW¶IRU6RWKHE\¶VDQG&KULVWLH¶V 
Targeting the Impressionism and modern art categories of the art market. The recruitment of 
Simon de Pury and Daniella Luxembourg equipped Phillips with the knowledge, connections 
and expertise required to become established within the Impressionism and modern art markets. 
However, key executives of Phillips admitted that there was no other way than paying large 
guarantees in order to acquire valuable collections for Impressionism and modern art sales 
(Luxembourg, 2014) and build market share (de Pury, 2016), while the high expenditure with 
which they established their presence in New York was the only way to compete in the high-
end auction market (Thomson, in Cuozzo, 2000). Although the sensemaking of Phillips 
executives was relatively high, their actions were possibly influenFHGE\$UQDXOW¶VGHFLVLRQWR
compete in the high-end auction market. Phillips seemed to lack processes and norms which 
would permit those top executives who suggested targeting the middle-segment of the auction 
market to negotiate and influence the strategy of the auction house. In addition, adjustments, 
such as the reduction in the use of guarantees and the downsizing that took place after the exit 
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of LVMH from Phillips, demonstrate that /90+¶VVWUDWHJ\ for Phillips was unsustainable. 
Nevertheless, Phillips retreated from the Impressionism and modern art markets only after an 
additional failed sale in 2003, indicating the relatively low sensemaking of de Pury and 
Luxembourg in assessing the potential of Phillips in these art markets during and after the 
LVM+¶V\HDUV 
The extensive use of financial guarantees to acquire valuable collections and positive publicity. 
7KHDLPRI3KLOOLSV¶VVWUDWHJ\ZDVWRFRQVWUXFWLWVOHJLWLPDF\LQWKHKLJK-end auction industry 
mainly by using economic resources in the form of financial guarantees. Phillips failed to build 
reputation and trust in the high-end auction market, and found it very difficult to attract the 
same quality of consignments without the use of guarantees. Although LVMH showed high 
sensemaking in interpreting the importance of the publicity achieved through record sales, it 
was relatively negligent about the possibility of criticism from the media if it failed to sell these 
collections successfully. Specifically, the use of high guarantees created a downward spiral, 
forcing Phillips to set prices at high levels, and then attracting negative media coverage when 
these artworks failed to sell. This raised further concerns from commentators and stakeholders, 
ZKRIURPWKHEHJLQQLQJKDGVHHQ/90+¶VLQYHVWPHQWVLQWKe art world as being unrelated to 
its core business. This suggests that economic resources can only provide a temporary 
advantage for an art organisation, unless they are used to build expertise and knowledge in 
order to gain legitimacy in the art market as a trusted and innovative vendor. In addition, the 
PHGLDLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI3KLOOLSV¶VVWUDWHJ\DVXQVXFFHVVIXORUWRRULVN\DOVRSXWSUHVVXUHRQWKH
parent company, while the uncertainty and volatility encountered by the parent company, 
especially after 9/11, created further pressures for the auction house. 
2YHUDOOWKHILHUFHFRPSHWLWLRQRI6RWKHE\¶VDQG&KULVWLH¶VDQGWKHKLJKEDUJDLQLQJSRZHURI
the consigners, forced Phillips to provide high financial guarantees which proved detrimental 
to it. The involvement of LVMH in Phillips was generally considered to be a strength for the 
auction house, as it provided abundant economic resources. However, the excessive use of 
financial guarantees, which resulted in significant losses for LVMH, were symptomatic of 
$UQDXOW¶VLQVLVWHQFHRQHQWHULQJWKHKLJK-end auction market. The main cause of the failure was 
the inflexible strategic and organisational configuration created by his decision to build 
expertise in the most competitive segments of the art market, which UHGXFHG3KLOOLSV¶VVWUDWHJLF
ILW $UQDXOW¶V LQYROYHPHQW LQ 3KLOOLSV EHJDQ DQG HQGHG HPRWLRQDOO\ DV KLV LQLWLDO





By synthesising the literature of sensemaking and organisational failure, we have constructed 
a conceptual framework to analyse strategic decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. 
The concept of strategic sensemaking, which was originally based on the processes of scanning, 
interpreting and acting (Thomas et al., 1993), is extended here to include the processes of 
strategising and adjusting. While Thomas et al. (1993) claim that the processes of strategic 
sensemaking are sequential and rational, our analysis suggests that scanning, interpreting, 
strategising, acting and adjusting within uncertain environments, such as the art market, may 
take place in a non-linear and recursive way that supports continuous loops of improvement. It 
is particularly true of the art market that intuitive thinking is a suitable means of supporting the 
formulation of artistic strategies that aim to construct the legitimacy of art organisations on the 
basis of trust, originality and innovation; while the use of causal and effectual thinking may 
respectively ensure the commercial and organisational feasibility of the artistic strategy. This 
paper has examined a case in which strategic sensemaking was triggered mainly by intuitive 
thinking, exposing the merits of realising a novel artistic and entrepreneurial vision that 
established Phillips as a boutique auction house, but also the limitations of emotional and 
opportunistic decision-PDNLQJZKLFKFDQOHDGWRµEOLQGHGPDQDJHPHQW¶LIRQHRUPRUHRIWKH
processes of strategic sensemaking ± scanning, interpreting, strategising, acting and adjusting 
± are ignored. 
Our conceptual framework could assist art organisations to prevent failure in three ways. 
Firstly, art organisations have to master causal, effectual and intuitive types of thinking and to 
develop appropriate processes of sensemaking that detect opportunities and threats at the 
external environment, support the strategic configuration with appropriate organisational 
norms, resources, learning mechanisms and structures, and establish processes of adjustment 
to facilitate corrective actions when required. Secondly, our conceptual framework identifies 
knowledge, legitimacy and artistic innovation as the three components of strategising within 
the art market which can be used by art organisations to construct symbolic and economic value 
of art. Thirdly, our framework for strategic sensemaking introduces the process of adjustment 
which is of paramount importance for art organisations, not only by urging them to set key 
performance indicators which could assist the recognition of warning signals (Amankwah-
Amoah, 2016; Caves, 2000), but also by influencing them to build capabilities that would allow 
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them to predict their future needs in terms of knowledge, skills and expertise, taking the 
organisational and strategic configuration as well as the external environment into account. 
Art organisations can learn from the case of Phillips, which failed because it introduced rapid 
and extensive change without the incorporation of a process of adjustment. As a managerial 
implication we suggest that organisational change should keep pace with the process of 
adjustment to counterbalance the impact of impulsive, emotional and intuitive decisions on 
organisational performance. In addition, organisations operating within uncertain and rapidly 
changing environments are more likely to succeed when they experiment with more frequent 
and smaller changes, as long as they develop capabilities to measure or assess the impact of 
their actions and to conduct relevant adjustments. This could also explain why auction houses, 
VXFK DV 6RWKHE\¶V KDYH LQYHVWHG LQ GDWD DQDO\WLFV FDSDELOLWLHV LQ RUGHU WR LPSURYH WKH
sensemaking process of adjustment. Diverse sources of secondary data used in this research 
(e.g. Adam, 2014; Bennett, 2003; Scheep, 2001; Vogel, 2001) suggest that LVMH failed with 
3KLOOLSV EHFDXVH RI $UQDXOW¶V LQVLVWHQFH RQ FRPSHWLQJ ZLWKLQ WKH KLJK-end auction market, 
following a top-down approach to goal-setting and strategic direction that constrained the 
strategic fit (Clark & Rowlinson, 2004). A limitation of this analysis, which could be addressed 
in future research by using interviews within an organisation, is whether high strategic 
sensemaking is likely to be supported by a culture of openness and tolerance, based on norms 
that encourage decentralised decision-making and collective cognition (Akinci & Sadler-
Smith, 2018). 
Finally, our conceptual framework is limited to the analysis of commercial organisations in the 
art market, such as art galleries or auction houses, and our empirical findings reflect the case 
and historical period investigated. In its current version, our conceptual framework could be 
applied to investigate other cases of failure in the auction industry, such as the unsuccessful 
merger of the online auction platforms Paddle8 and Auctionata in 2016 which resulted in the 
insolvency of the latter in 2017 (Buffenstein, 2017). Future research could focus on studying 
strategic sensemaking in art institutions such as museums, biennials or foundations, which aim 
for audience engagement and stakeholder support instead of art trading (Robertson, 2015), to 
determine what constitutes an organisational failure for them. In addition, our conceptual 
framework in this paper is applied, to consider the organisation as a unit of analysis. By taking 
the perspective of agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), future studies could scrutinise the motives 
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strategic sensemaking. Finally, the lack of external validity in this research is compensated for 
by the analytical generalisation of our conceptual framework, which could be achieved in 
future research by modifying the elements of a strategic configuration ± knowledge, legitimacy, 
artistic innovation ± within a different institutional context (i.e. fashion, or the music industry). 
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